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IS THIS THE BECINNINC OF THE END OF THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION.
BY LUIS FUENTES*ROHWER
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 is, without ques-
tion, the most important and effective civil rights statute
in U.S. history.' Within the space of three years, the VRA
transformed the structure of electoral politics in the South
and allowed African-Americans to finally enjoy the right
to vote as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. This tremendous record of success is the
reason why the VRA is deservedly known as the hallmark.
of the Second Reconstruction.
Recent cases suggest, however, that the constitutionality
of the VRA hangs in the balance and may soon be struck
down by a conservative Supreme Court. In Namudno
v. Holder, for example, Chief Justice Roberts recited the
usual criticisms lodged at the act-that it unfairly targets
the covered states, for example, or that conditions have
improved-only to then invoke the avoidance doctrine and
decide the case on statutory grounds.' The Court decided
to postpone the constitutional question for another day.
Similarly, during oral argument in the case, the questions
from the conservative justices underscored their unease
over the constitutionality of the VRA. This year, in the Texas
redistricting case, Perez v. Perry, Justice Thomas concurred
in the judgment vacating the lower court's judgment but
wrote a separate opinion to highlight his view that the
VRA-particularly 5 5, the central feature of the law, which
demands that covered jurisdictions pre-clear their voting
changes prior to implementation-is unconstitutional.3
The constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act may be
the biggest story of our generation. The Roberts Court
appears poised to bring down the Second Reconstruction.
We may be on the cusp of a new constitutional moment.
Yet no one seems to be paying attention.4
The story begins in 1966, in the chambers of Chief
Justice Warren.
As soon as President Johnson signed the Voting Rights
Act into law on Aug. 6, 1965, the state of South Carolina
challenged its constitutionality. The Supreme Court expe-
dited the case and heard oral arguments a scant five
months later, on Jan. 17-18, 1966. Three weeks later, on
Feb. 8, Chief Justice Warren finished his draft of the opin-
ion, which he circulated two weeks later, on Feb. 23. The
Court issued its opinion on March 7, 1966.
It was clear that the Voting Rights Act was no ordinary
statute; rather, it was an aggressive and assertive solution
to a grave national embarrassment. According to the VRA,
select jurisdictions could not be trusted to implement and/
or enforce fair and nonracially discriminatory voter reg-
istration tests. Given this history, the VRA targeted these
jurisdictions and provided for the appointment of federal
examiners and registrars as needed. More important, the
act required that these jurisdictions pre-clear any changes
to their voting laws with the U.S. Department of Justice or
in the district court in Washington, D.C. The radical nature
of this approach was undeniable. This is the reason why
Congress limited these special provisions of the act to five
years; in the words of Rep. Don Edwards during the House
hearings in 1975, "After a few years of harsh measures, the
practices of a lifetime would be reversed and special fed-
eral protection would no longer be necessary."6
It came as no surprise that the Warren Court upheld
the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
Central to the Court's opinion in this case was the view
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that Congress had "explored with great care the problem
of racial discrimination in voting" and had documented "in
considerable detail" its findings and conclusions. Early in his
opinion, the chief justice noted that Congress had debated
the measure in hearings that lasted more than nine days,
and the debate on the floor of both chambers had taken
29 days. For further support, the chief justice "pause[d] ...
to summarize the majority reports of the House and Senate
Committees, which document in considerable detail the
factual basis for these reactions by Congress."7 The con-
clusion was inescapable: "an insidious and pervasive evil
... had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country,"
and earlier attempts to deal with the problem had proven
unsuccessful; they "would have to be replaced by sterner
and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear
commands of the Fifteenth Amendment." Without ques-
tion, legislative findings-that is, the record of abuses put
together by Congress-played a prominent role in the case
of South Carolina v. Katzenbach.8
To Justice Brennan, it was a mistake to accept the find-
ings of the Congress in this way. In a memo to the Chief
Justice written Feb. 26, 1966, Justice Brennan wrote that
"this is really a fine opinion," and he gladly joined the
majority. But he had many questions, which he expressed
in the margins of his circulated draft. For example, in
response to the first part of the opinion, he complained
that "[ilt seems to me one thing to summarize the facts
put before the legislature, and another to do what the
Chief seems to be up to in this [section]-accepting the
Congressional findings because they correspond to our
own." The chief justice's references to the process that led
to the passage of the legislation were similarly misguided:
"Do we judge statutes by no. of witnesses[,] length of hear-
ings[,] unanimity of vote? The Chief is judging the legisla-
tive product as if it were a judicial one." Brennan repeated
this criticism at the close of the first part of the draft: "In
several places, like this one, the Chief comes close to writ-
ing this as if it were an advisory opinion. I think this might
be avoided. Are we reviewing the sections, any more than
we are the adequacy of the hearings?"'
The debate between Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan was a debate about the scope of congressional
power and the demands of rationality review-that is,
whether there exists a rational relation to a legitimate state
interest. The justices agreed that rationality review applied,
as well as its demand that the law must be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. To Justice Brennan,
however, rationality review did not require explicit find-
ings by the U.S. Congress. This assessment had been true
in the Commerce Clause context since at least 1937, and
Justice Brennan did not want the Court to establish such a
requirement under the Reconstruction amendments. After
all, different minds in the future could always disagree
about the sufficiency of the available record. Or, what if
Congress had no findings at all? Quite presciently, Justice
Brennan wished to avoid this problem.
But the Chief Justice had a different set of concerns.
Aware of criticisms of the VRA as a punitive measure
against the Southern states, Chief Justice Warren seemed to
go out of his way to show otherwise. If findings were not
necessary as a matter of law, he believed that they were
necessary in this case.
Justice Brennan's concerns surfaced in the very next
VRA case, Katzenbach v. Morgan, decided on June 13,
1966. Under § 4(e) of the act, an otherwise eligible voter
who completed a sixth-grade education in an "American-
flag" school, where the language of instruction was not
English, may not be denied the right to vote on account
of his or her failure to pass an English literacy test. This
section was in direct conflict with a case decided only
seven years earlier, Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,
which upheld the constitutionality of literacy tests.10 To
be sure, Justice Douglas emphasized in Lassiter that "a
literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetu-
ate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment
was designed to uproot." No such discrimination could be
charged in Morgan, because, as Justice Harlan highlighted
in his dissenting opinion, "[there is simply no legislative
record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the
sort we have hitherto insisted upon when congressional
power is brought to bear on constitutionally reserved state
concerns." What would the Chief Justice do this time?
Chief Justice Warren ended up doing a very smart thing:
he assigned the opinion to Justice Brennan. There is a great
deal of irony in the Chief Justice's decision to do so. Had
he followed Brennan's advice, Morgan would have been
an easy case. Instead, South Carolina v. Katzenbach forced
Brennan to do the very thing he had tried to avoid: point to
the record in order to uphold § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act.
This was the only way that Congress could comply with the
explicit demands of Lassiter. Or so it appeared.
As in Soutb Carolina, the Court in Morgan hap-
pily deferred to the work of Congress in a matter of
great national importance. Accordingly, the Court found
that 5 4(e) was "appropriate legislation" to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment because it "may be viewed as a
measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing
in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government."
(Emphasis added.) The scope of congressional authority in
this area was wide, and the role for the Court was quite
limited. For example, in reference to the argument that
5 4(e) would result in enhanced political power, which
would in turn "be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory
treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican
community," Justice Brennan explained that "[ilt is not for
us to review the congressional resolution of these factors.
It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."
Justice Brennan's quandary needs to be understood:
The Court in Lassiter upheld the constitutionality of literacy
tests absent a finding of racial discrimination. Congress had
no such findings in support of § 4(e), yet it struck down
such a test as applied to a narrow subset of voters. Could
Congress reinterpret the meaning of "equal protection" as
applied to this narrow subset in the face of a contrary judi-
cial interpretation? Put differently: What should the Court
do when Congress enforces-that is, defines-"equal pro-
tection" in a way that directly contradicts a prior judicial
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definition? Justice Douglas' conference notes in Morgan
make it clear that the justices considered Morgan an easy
case. To Justice White, for example, § 4(e) was simply "a
congressional definition of 'equal protection."' Chief Justice
Warren similarly argued that "Congress need not make
findings if it can justify its conduct on any rational basis,"
and Justice Fortas agreed with this position. This view was
in tension with the South Carolina case, yet neither justice
apparently saw it that way. Justice Black was "happy to
agree to this historic opinion which for the first time gives
[51 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment the full scope it was
intended to have." Only Justice Harlan disagreed, stating
that "Congress can't define what is equal protection.""
The lack of a record forced the Court to interpret the
power provided by 5 5 of the Voting Rights Act expan-
sively, as "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment." But, as Justice Harlan
pointed out in dissent, would this mean that Congress
could exercise its discretion the other way and "dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court"?
Not so, stated Brennan: " 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."
This solution, known as the "Morgan power," harmo-
nized with Justice Brennan's notion in South Carolina
about the proper role of Congress in carrying out the
promise of the Reconstruction amendments. This solution
relies on the justices' implicit commitment to share power
with Congress. The justices do not have all the answers,
and the Morgan power simply recognizes that fact.
If this sounds too good to be true, it was. The ultimate
fate of the Morgan power is reminiscent of Justice Roberts'
passage in Smith v. Allwright in 1944. In the dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Roberts wrote that "the instant decision ... tends
to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as
a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."
This is because by the very next case, Oregon v. Mitchell, the
Morgan power had apparently accomplished everything it
had set out to do. The justices would no longer invoke it.'2
But the Morgan power is still important today for how
it frames the debate about the proper role of the Supreme
Court in a society committed to democratic values. Justice
Brennan was on one side of this debate. He believed
that the Court should defer to Congress when Congress
attempts to remedy a difficult public policy problem. This
view recognizes the limits of judicial review and the fal-
libility of the Court.
Justice Harlan is on the other side of the debate, as is
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in South Carolina. This side
takes a muscular view of the Court and its role in a mature
democracy. Under this view, the Court's deference to
Congress is much more conditional. The Court-and only
the Court-decides when the legislative record rises to an
acceptable constitutional level so as to justify the legisla-
tion. But this is a matter of degree and needs to consider
the following questions:
* How many witnesses are needed?
* How many committee hearings should take place?
* What kind of evidence is needed to show that racial dis-
crimination in voting has, or has not, been eradicated?
These might have been easy questions to answer in
1966, in the days of Sheriffs Jim Clark and Bull Connor,
notoriously racist law enforcement officials in Alabama,
and when disenfranchising practices were rampant and in
the open. In taking the long view, it is likely that Justice
Brennan understood quite well that these questions would
become much harder to answer in due time.
History shows that Justice Brennan's concerns have
come to pass. In 1975, Congress extended the special
provisions of the Voting Rights Act for seven years, on the
basis that the act had yet to accomplish its stated goals.
The Supreme Court upheld this extension five years later,
in City of Rome v. United States, in which the arguments
were eerily familiar. To the majority, "Congress[I'] consid-
ered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory
remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95
years of pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurpris-
ing and unassailable." In his dissent, then Justice Rehnquist
objected to the Court's abdication of its authority, traced
back to the canonical Marbury v. Madison, "to ensure
that a challenged congressional Act does no more than
'enforce' the limitations on state power established in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." The debate was
repeated in 1989, in Lopez v. Monterey County: one side
showing deference, buttressed by adequate findings, the
other side favoring muscular, aggressive review.13
When Congress extended the special provisions of
the Voting Rights Act for another 25 years in 2006, the
debate predictably focused on the issue of congressional
findings. The central question seemed deceptively simple:
Have we reached a point in our history where the act is
no longer an appropriate response to any remaining racial
discrimination in voting? But make no mistake, this was
not an easy question. Witnesses gave Congress conflict-
ing answers to this question. After hearing the evidence,
Congress extended the act until 2032.
Only this time, the Court did not stick to its tradi-
tional script. It is true that, in its ruling in Northwest Austin
Municipal District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO) in
2009, the Court deferred to Congress, in the limited sense that
the justices did not strike down the VRA. But that case was
not like the cases that had preceded it. Whereas in prior cases
the Court happily pointed to the record and interpreted it in
helpful and forgiving ways, in NAMUDNO, the Court took a
more critical approach. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
John Roberts conceded that "[t]he historic accomplishments
of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable." For example-
* Discrimination in the South is now much improved.
* Voter turnout and registration rates between whites and
African-Americans are close to equal.
* Blatant evasions of federal decrees are no longer the
norm.
* There are more offices held by members of minority
groups today than ever before.
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These facts validate the provisions in the Voting Rights
Act and its various extensions. The question for the future,
as Chief Justice Roberts put it during the oral argument in
NAMUDNO, is that, "at some point it begins to look like the
idea is that this is going to go on forever."" The conserva-
tive justices are clearly skeptical of this assessment.
Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One set the
stage for the Court finally to strike down the Voting Rights
Act on constitutional grounds. The Court could have picked
from a number of available arguments. For example, that
the VRA is old and "fails to account for current political
conditions"; or that the act imposes "substantial 'federal-
ism costs"'; or else, that the act "differentiates between the
States, despite our historic tradition that all states enjoy
'equal sovereignty."' The last argument is particularly
important because it appears to be on Justice Kennedy's
mind. In oral argument in the case, for example, he offered
the following comment: "the Congress has made a finding
that the sovereignty of Georgia is less than the sovereign
dignity of Ohio. The sovereignty of Alabama ... is less
than the sovereignty of Michigan. And the governments
in one are to be trusted less than the governments in the
other." And in the recent decision involving redistricting,
as argued in Perry v. Perez, he similarly complained about
the "tremendous disadvantage" at which 5 5 of the VRA
places Texas. Justice Kennedy saw this as a burden that
"applies only to-to some states and not others." It is well
understood that Justice Kennedy holds the fifth vote to
strike down the act. It is also true that he is skeptical of
the constitutionality of the act."
In the end, however, the Court punted. Rather than
address the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court dis-
posed of the NAMUDNO case on statutory grounds. In
professing adherence to its avoidance doctrine, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs were able to escape from cov-
erage under 5 4(b) of the VRA (that is, bailout). And once
the plaintiffs could escape coverage, the Court no longer
needed to reach the constitutional question. The hitch was
that the Court interpreted the statute in a way that its plain
language simply did not bear. The Court went out of its
way to dispose of the case on nonconstitutional grounds,
even if doing so required stretching the language of the act
to its outer limits-or perhaps beyond.
What possibly could have happened to make the Court
so anxious to dodge the issue of the constitutionality of the
act in Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One? One
explanation is that the Court must tread carefully around
these explosive issues. To strike down the Voting Rights Act
is to take on the Second Reconstruction and to thrust the
Supreme Court into the center of the firestorm over voting
rights and minority communities. Another explanation could
be the timing of the decision: the Court decided NAMUDNO
on June 22, 2009; a week later, on June 29, the Court issued
its order for the parties to reargue the case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.6 In the tradition of
Alexander Hamilton and, later, Alexander Bickel, the Court
must take its time and conserve its legitimacy." Striking
down the Voting Rights Act while at the same time deciding
Citizens United might have been too much for the public to
bear. Surely, handing down decisions in both these cases
would have been imprudent. Perhaps the justices simply
decided to bide their time.
Another possible explanation for failing to consider the
constitutionality of the VRA when deciding NAMUDNO is
that Justice Kennedy simply could not make up his mind.
We have seen this before-for example, in the case of
Vieth v. Jubelirer, which dealt with political gerrymander-
ing in Pennsylvania and a case in which Justice Kennedy
could side with neither the plurality nor the four dissent-
ers, yet remained unsure as to whether a standard to
govern political gerrymandering cases "will emerge in the
future."" As a super median vote, Justice Kennedy's vote
carries great weight, and his uncertainty can lead to puz-
zling results. Northwest Austin Municipal District Number
One v. Holder might have been one of those cases.
Nevertheless, I suspect that a showdown is looming. In
every related case, from the South Carolina voter identifica-
tion case to the Texas Redistricting Cases, litigants happily
remind the Supreme Court of the constitutional stakes at
issue. These questions are not going away. Therefore, as we
look to the future, it is worthwhile to take a moment to reflect
on the bigger picture. Questions of voting rights in the United
States have generally been questions of institutional com-
petence, and this is particularly true for questions of voting
rights for communities of color. This is a story, incidentally,
in which the Supreme Court has played a secondary role to
the work of Congress. Justice Brennan understood this his-
tory, as reflected by his critical stance in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach and his opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan.
The country's constitutional culture is clearly different
today than it was at the time the Court decided Morgan.
The Court is far more assertive and muscular than it used
to be, and the political question doctrine seems to be
largely a relic of our constitutional past. But as we debate
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act-not to men-
tion the constitutionality of President Obama's health care
legislation, which was argued before the Court in March-
we must ask ourselves what role the nation's unelected,
largely unaccountable Court should play in deciding these
questions. To put the question in a slightly different way,
what institution is best situated to decide these questions?
If history serves as a guide, there is an easy answer
to the question of the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act. Deference to Congress has been-and should
continue to be-the order of the day. Indeed, were the
Supreme Court to second-guess Congress' findings, the
historical parallels to the Waite Court and the fall of the
First Reconstruction would be unavoidable. TFL
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer is a law professor and Harry T. Ice Fel-
low at Indiana University's Maurer School of Law.
Endnotes
'42 U.S.C. 5 1973 et seq.
2Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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